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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4796
The surge in global commodity prices of the past few 
years has presented a tremendous development challenge 
for South Asian countries. The large loss of income from 
the terms of trade shock has worsened macroeconomic 
balances, fueled rapid inflation, and hurt growth. 
Although commodity prices have come down recently, 
the benefits are being clouded by the emergence of a 
severe global financial crisis. The adverse consequences 
of the food price hike for the poor are large; the global 
financial crisis could further worsen the situation due 
to falling economic opportunities and government 
revenues. South Asian countries need to accelerate 
reforms to avoid facing a serious downturn in economic 
This paper—a product of the  South Asia Regional Programs Unit of the South Asia Region—is part of a larger effort in 
the region to promote more and better regional cooperation in South Asia. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted 
on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at Sahmed2@worldbank.org.  
activity, investment, exports, and income. Governments 
in South Asia have responded by stabilizing domestic 
food prices through a number of short-term measures, 
tightened monetary policy to reduce inflation, and 
increased spending on a range of safety net programs for 
the poor.  Some of the policies employed, such as export 
bans, are not consistent with the long-term welfare of the 
country or the region. Safety net interventions need to 
be made consistent with a longer-term poverty reduction 
strategy and fiscal sustainability. Most importantly, policy 
attention now needs to shift toward efforts to increase 
farm productivity, improve rural infrastructure, and lower 
the vulnerability of the poor.
Global Food Price Inflation: Implications for South Asia, Policy 
Reactions, and Future Challenges1 
 
Sadiq Ahmed 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The surge in global commodity prices of the past few years has presented a tremendous 
development challenge to South Asian countries. On a net basis South Asia is estimated 
to have suffered an income loss equivalent to some 9.6 percent of GDP between January 
2003 and April 2008.  Although much of the income loss resulted from the hike in 
petroleum prices, the surge in food prices between January 2007 and April 2008, 
especially of staple food--wheat and rice--has created tremendous adverse social impacts 
in South Asia.  All countries have witnessed an unprecedented surge in food prices, 
although India was able to limit the increase owing to good harvests and timely 
interventions using stock management and public food distribution. Net food importing 
countries like Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh have suffered the most from the 
food price crisis. 
 
The adverse effect of the rise in global commodity prices on macroeconomic balances 
has been substantial. South Asian countries have seen a sharp increase in fiscal deficits 
and a worsening in the balance of payments. Inflation has been hit badly.  For the first 
time in South Asia’s history, all countries have simultaneously experienced double-digit 
inflation rates, with 20 plus rates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.  Economic 
growth is showing signs of a slowdown as countries seek to arrest the deterioration in 
macroeconomic imbalances and rising inflationary pressures through demand 
management measures.  The emerging global financial crisis is adding fuel to the fire, 
with further adverse consequences for macroeconomic balances and growth.  
 
The twin global crises of higher commodity prices and financial turmoil have come at a 
time when most South Asian countries are in a state of political transition. Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, and India are facing national elections within the next 12 months.  Nepal and 
Pakistan have recently emerged from the election process with new governments in place 
under a hugely different political environment than previously. Sri Lanka is still fighting 
a civil war.  So, arguably, the political economy of policy management has seldom been 
so challenging in South Asia. In all countries, the immediate political economy concern is 
to stabilize domestic food prices and lower inflation.  This concern is easy to see when 
one looks at the adverse consequences for poverty reduction. The share of food 
consumption in total consumption is extremely high in South Asia, averaging nearly 50 
percent as compared to 17 percent in the United States. It is even higher for the poor, who 
as a result have been hurt most by the increase in food prices.   
                                                     
1 The author is with the World Bank in Washington DC. The paper benefitted from country policy notes 
prepared by world bank staff.  Comments from Adolfo Brizzi, Ambar Narayan, Hassan Zaman, Mansoora 
Rashid and Tara Vishwanath are gratefully acknowledged. Veronica Minos Lazarus and Moutushi Islam 
provided competent research assistance.  All views expressed in the paper are those of the author and do 
not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank Group.  Errors are the sole responsibility of the author.   
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While much of the immediate policy focus has been on food price stabilization, 
especially for staple foods—wheat and rice-- the implications of the various short-term 
price stabilization policies for longer-term supply response, growth, economic efficiency 
and fiscal sustainability have not always been analyzed or thought through.  South Asian 
countries have also intervened to put in place various safety net programs to protect the 
poor.  This has been a combination of activating or expanding existing schemes and 
introducing new schemes.  The efficiency and effectiveness of these schemes in terms of 
outcomes and consistency with fiscal sustainability in an environment of external shocks 
and very tight fiscal space also need much more thought, analysis and review.  
 
The main objective of this paper is to provide input to the policy debate and analysis of 
how South Asia needs to position itself to respond effectively to the global food price 
crisis. To put this debate in proper context, the paper first provides a brief analysis of the 
nature of the global food price crisis focusing on the two staple food items--wheat and 
rice—that have occupied the primary attention of policy makers. It shows the strong 
positive link between the prices of food and energy, which emphasizes the need to look at 
them together.  Section III of the paper then looks at the supply, demand and price 
situation in South Asia for these staple food items, explaining why prices have diverged 
so much between countries within the region and in comparison with global prices.  In 
Section IV, the paper reviews the impact of the food and fuel price crisis in South Asian 
countries in terms income, macroeconomic balances, inflation and poverty.  How the 
various countries have responded on the policy front is reviewed in Section V. Section VI 
looks at the longer-term issues and challenges, including the consistency of short-term 
actions with the longer-term agenda. Finally, Section VII provides some concluding 
observations. 
 
II. Global Food Price Inflation 
 
Global food prices have been on an upward trend for a fairly long time, particularly since 
2005. Prices accelerated starting in January 2007.  Based on the Food and Agriculture 
Organization’s (FAO) World Food Price Index, international food prices in April 2008 
were 60 percent higher than 12 months earlier. World food prices have in particular been 
driven by higher grain prices.  Two staple food grain of special importance to South Asia 
are wheat and rice. The international price of wheat more than tripled between 2002 and 
March 2008 (figure 1). The wheat price was relatively stable until 2006, but surged in 
2007 and early 2008, reaching a global peak in March 2008. The price has since then 
come down, but as of August 2008 it remained 70 percent higher than the average price 
in 2006. The price of rice increased nearly five-fold between 2002 and May 2008, when 
it reached a global peak. Rice price started rising since 2004, but the spike came in 2008 
when the price more than doubled in five months between January and May.  Rice price 
has also come down after May.  Even so, as of August 2008, international rice price was 
128 percent higher than the average in 2006.  These large increases in prices of food 
grain have huge adverse implications for world poverty. 
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Figure1:  Global Prices of Rice and Wheat (2002=100)
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Source: IMF International Financial Statistics and World Bank’s Global Economic Monitoring Database 
 
 
Global food prices have increased because of a combination of factors including rising 
population, rapid economic growth in emerging markets, high energy and fertilizer 
prices, increased use of food crops for bio-fuels, rapid demand increase for some food 
crops, depreciation of the US dollar, and declining global stocks of food grains due to 
changes to buffer stock policies in the US and the European Union. Back-to-back 
droughts in Australia, and growing global demand for grains (excluding for bio-fuel 
production) have been modest contributors and on their own would not have led to large 
price increases. Commodity investors and hedge fund activity also seem to have played a 
minor role. Although empirical evidence is scarce, the prevailing consensus among 
market analysts is that fundamentals and policy decisions are the key drivers of food 
price rises, rather than speculative activity (World Bank 2008a). 
 
III. Global Supply-Demand Imbalance 
 
Table 1 shows the world production and consumption trends for wheat, rice and 
foodgrain over the past 10 years. A number of interesting results emerge.  First, between 
1999 and 2008 world food consumption has grown faster than production causing a fairly 
substantial drawdown of stocks (figure 2).  Second, wheat production faced difficulties 
over the 2005-2007, but there has been strong recovery in 2008-2009. Third, in contrast 
to wheat, rice production increased significantly during 2005-2008 and overall 
production has basically exceeded consumption. 
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Table 1: World Foodgrain Demand-Supply Situation, 1999-2009 
 (millions of metric tons) 
Wheat Rice, milled Food Grain Year  
Production  Consumption Production Consumption Production  Consumption 
1999/00 586.7 585.0 408.9 399.8 1,873.60 1,867.60
2000/01 582.9 585.0 398.9 395.3 1,844.80 1,864.80
2001/02 583.1 587.1 399.7 413.4 1,877.90 1,908.00
2002/03 568.7 605.3 378.3 408.0 1,822.80 1,917.20
2003/04 553.8 588.6 391.9 414.0 1,862.40 1,948.10
2004/05 625.7 606.9 401.3 409.3 2,043.60 1,995.60
2005/06 620.9 624.4 418.3 415.8 2,018.90 2,033.60
2006/07 596.3 616.9 420.2 420.6 2,005.30 2,053.50
2007/08 610.5 622.1 429 426.6 2,115.50 2,114.90
2008/09 670.8 649.8 430.8 427.7 2,190.60 2,170.60
Source: USDA      
 
 
Figure 2: Global Wheat and Rice Stocks
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Source: USDA database 
 
To what extent do these trends explain the rising prices?  The drawdown of reserves 
during1999-2008 is a clear indication of a global tightening of food markets with obvious 
implications for rising prices. The acceleration of wheat price increases during 2006-2008 
is partly explained by the large imbalance between supply and demand in this period, 
accentuated of course by adverse market expectations and the generally low short-term 
supply-demand elasticities.  But the behavior of rice prices and its acceleration in 2007-
2008 is not explained by demand-supply imbalances.  As noted earlier, unlike wheat 
overall rice production exceeded consumption during 2006-2008 and yet prices hit the 
roof.  One needs to look at other factors.    Two critical factors are trade policies and cost 
of production. 
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Adverse Effects of Trade Policy Bans:    The introduction of export restrictions and bans 
― such as those imposed by India and China on rice, or by Argentina, Kazakhstan, 
Pakistan, and Russia on wheat ― has further restricted global supply and aggravated 
shortages. Initial actions by a few large exporting countries prompted others to quickly 
follow suit, undermining trust in the market and leading to worse outcomes for all. The 
result has been a self-reinforcing price spiral. This is well illustrated for the rice market in 
a recent study by Brahmbhatt and Christiaensen (2008).  India’s decision to ban rice 
exports (except for ‘Basmati’ rice) was quickly followed by export restrictions placed by 
Vietnam and other major players, with an immediate impact on prices.  Actions by large 
rice importers, such as the Philippines, which organized large tenders to obtain needed 
rice imports against this background of shrinking traded supplies, further aggravated the 
problem (see Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3: Rice prices and recent policy responses $/Ton; January 2004-April 2008 
 
 
 
Surge in cost of production: A second and more long-term factor is the rising cost of 
production. Key inputs, such as fertilizer, diesel, electricity and transport have all gone up 
tremendously at the global level linked to energy prices (figure 4).  The increase in 
fertilizer prices is particularly telling, rising more than by four times between 2002 and 
2008; the sharpest increase came after 2006. This increase in cost of production is an 
important structural factor that explains why prices have rice and wheat prices increased 
so rapidly in the past 2 years. 
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Figure 4: Global Fuel and Fertilizer Prices
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Source: IMF  IFS Yearbook, World Bank Commodity Prices 
 
Expected Near to-Medium-Term Outlook for International Food Prices 
 
While short-term fluctuations in food production compounded by trade restrictions had a 
negative impact on short-term food prices, one good news for near-term prices is the 
bumper global harvests for wheat in 2008-09.  Rice production has also increased. As a 
result, stocks are being replenished putting a downward push to global prices. The lifting 
of the trade bans will help lower prices further.  Yet, it is clear that the underlying 
economics of food markets has changed substantially and unless energy prices were to 
collapse to the levels found in 2004, the global price of rice and wheat will not likely 
return to the pre-crisis prices of 2004.  Expected outlook for prices in the near to medium 
term are shown in Table 2. These projections show the substantial reduction in projected 
annual average oil and fertilizer prices from the peak levels in 2008. While these 
projected input prices are significantly lower than the local peak (especially for oil that 
reached a monthly average of $134/per barrel in July 2008), they are substantially higher 
than the average prices in 2004 reflecting the realities of world demand and supply.  
Also, as the global recession eases commodity prices are likely to rebound.   
 
 
Table 2: Projected average global wheat and rice prices, 2007-2010 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 
Oil ($/barrel) 72.5 101.2 74.5 75.8 
Rice ($/MT) 326.4 660.0 446.0 459.0 
Wheat ($/MT) 255.2 330.0 255.0 262.0 
Fertilizer ($/MT) 309.4 544.0 388.0 299.0 
Source: World Bank Prospects for the Global Economy (November 2008) 
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Food Situation in South Asia2 
 
Supply and Demand Factors:     Tables 3 and 4 show the trends in rice and wheat 
production and consumption in South Asia over 2000-2008.  Total food production (rice  
 
Table 3: South Asia Food Grain Production (1000 MT) 
 
  2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 
Afghanistan 169 157 260 174 312 315 362 335 168
Bangladesh 25,086 24,310 25,187 26,152 25.600 28,758 29,000 28,600 29,400
India 84,980 93,340 71,820 88,530 83,130 91,790 93,350 96,430 96,000
Nepal 2,808 2,774 2,752 2,752 2,968 2,857 2,804 2,810 2,850
Pakistan 4,802 3,882 4,479 4,848 5,025 5,547 5,200 5,500 5,600
Sri Lanka 1,940 1,820 2,058 1,900 1,974 2,100 2,145 2,200 2,300
South Asia 119,785 126,283 106,556 124,356 119,009 131,367 132,861 135,875 136,318
R
ic
e 
World 398,902 399,700 378,318 391,861 401,298 418,313 420,164 428,989 430,751
Afghanistan 1,469 1,597 2,686 3,480 2,293 4,265 3,200 3,800 1,500
Bangladesh 1672 1610 1510 1253 976 820 740 1200 800
India 76,369 69,680 71,810 65,100 72,150 68,640 69,350 75,810 78,400
Nepal 1,184 1,157 1,258 1,344 1,387 1,442 1,394 1,395 1,400
Pakistan 21,079 19,024 18,227 19,183 19,500 21,612 21,277 23,300 21,500
South Asia 101794 93088 95511 90380 96326 96,799 95981 105325 103620
W
he
at
 
World 582,899 583,078 568,708 553,838 625,738 620,851 596,273 610,537 670,751
Source: USDA Database 
 
Table 4: South Asia Food Grain Consumption (1000 MT) 
  2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 2008/2009 
Afghanistan 385 427 440 369 455 516 550 485 343 
Bangladesh 24,958 25,553 26,100 26,700 26,900 29,000 29,764 30.600 30,600 
India 75,960 87,611 79,860 85,630 80,861 85,088 86,940 90,760 93,000 
Nepal 2,828 2,793 2,762 2,756 3,029 2,859 2,863 2,870 2,910 
Pakistan 2,615 2,540 2,545 2,595 2,550 1,896 2,257 2,450 2,420 
Sri Lanka 2,020 2,075 2,100 2,075 2,139 2,150 2,152 2,287 2,376 
South Asia 108,766 120,999 113,807 120,125 115,934 121,509 124,526 129,052 131,349 
R
ic
e 
World 393,291 412,455 405,681 411,615 406,545 411,629 417,017 421,962 425,519 
Afghanistan 2,043 2,597 3,186 3,930 3,293 4,765 4,250 4,700 3,800 
Bangladesh 2866 2950 3000 3050 3000 2950 2800 2900 2850 
India 66,821 65,125 74,294 68,258 72,838 69,971 73,358 75,850 77,600 
Nepal 1,194 1,158 1,266 1,361 1,407 1,462 1,408 1,415 1,420 
Pakistan 20,500 19,800 18,380 19,100 19,600 20,900 21,900 22,400 22,600 
Sri Lanka 850 801 875 931 950 1,000 817 825 850 
South Asia 94,294 92,451 101,028 96,655 101,118 101,078 104,563 108,120 109,150 
W
he
at
 
World 583,564 587,816 603,659 581,173 605,943 618,197 618,703 619,007 647,079 
Source: USDA 
                                                     
2 Due to data limitations, the paper is not able to cover Bhutan and Maldives  
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and wheat) grew at a slow pace of 1.0 percent per annum as compared with consumption  
growth of 2.3 (Table 5). South Asia’s production growth has been slower than world 
production while consumption growth rate has much exceeded the world consumption 
growth rate.  This is partly owing to a faster pace of expansion of South Asia’s 
population, but also reflects a positive income elasticity.   
 
There are significant differences at the country level in terms of production and 
consumption behavior, but all countries share the common result that on average food 
consumption has exceeded production during 1999-2008. In India, South Asia’s largest 
grain producer for both rice and wheat accounting for 71 and 76 percent of production 
respectively, wheat production has barely expanded during 1999-2008 although rice 
production has shown a healthy trend.  In Pakistan, a primarily wheat consuming country 
and accounting for 21 percent of South Asia’s total wheat production,  the production has 
fluctuated widely on a year-to-year basis but has been basically flat in 2000-2008, like in 
India.  The other large foodgrain producer, Bangladesh, which is primarily a rice 
consuming country and accounts for 20 percent of South Asia’s rice production, has 
registered a production growth of  2.0 percent per year in rice. In sharp contrast to the 
production pattern, the rate of growth of food grain consumption in all three large 
producing countries have outstripped production.3 
 
The story is similar in the smaller countries of Afghanistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. The 
data are not very reliable for Afghanistan, but it is a hugely food deficit country and relies 
mostly on wheat imports from Pakistan.  Nepal’s rice production has stagnated but wheat 
production has expanded; overall foodgrain consumption growth exceeds production.   In 
Sri Lanka, which is primarily a rice eating country, production of rice has been somewhat 
higher than production of wheat, allowing Sri Lanka to reduce its reliance on wheat 
imports. 
  
Table 5: Annual growth rates in production and consumption of food in South 
Asian Countries, 2000-2008 (percent) 
Countries    Production growth          
Wheat     Rice       Total     
Consumption growth 
Wheat     Rice      Total 
Population 
growth  
Bangladesh -8.8         2.0             1.5 0.0           2.6            2.3 1.6
India   0.3          1.5             1.0  1.9          2.6            2.3 1.7
Nepal   2.1          0.2             0.8  2.2          0.4            0.9 2.3
Pakistan  0.3          1.8             0.8  1.2         -1.0            1.0 2.6
Sri Lanka  0.0          2.2             n.a.  2.0           0.0           1.6 0.9
South Asia  1.6           0.2            1.0     2.2           2.4           2.3 1.9
World  1.8          1.0             1.5  1.3           1.0           1.2  1.1
Source: Production, Consumption growth rates calculated from Tables 3 and 4.  Population data from 
World Bank World Development Indicators 
 
                                                     
3 Surprisingly, however, Pakistan’s consumption growth for foodgrain is substantially lower than the 
population growth rate suggesting negative income elasticity.  This could alternatively reflect data 
problems.  
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What are the implications of these production and consumption trends for food 
availability and prices?   In 2000 South Asia had a production surplus of almost 11 
million MT of rice and 7.5 million MT of wheat.  By 2008 the wheat surplus had 
vanished and converted into a deficit of about 6 million MT.  The rice surplus also fell to 
around 5 million MT.  The production shortfalls in wheat were met mostly by drawdown 
of reserves (Figures 5 and 6). South Asia’s largest grain producer, India, had built up a 
huge foodgrain stock, partly for food security reasons and partly to provide price support 
to farmers. Thus in 2001/02 India had accumulated stocks of 25 million MT of rice and 
25 million MT of wheat. These reserves were drawn down over the coming years, mostly 
to meet the consumption gap in wheat but also to reduce fiscal cost and physical wastage 
through rice exports.   By 2005/06 the wheat stock had fallen to only 2 million MT 
causing a reversal in policy to build up reserves.  Rice stocks also started rising in 
2004/05 recovering from the low levels of 9.5 million ton. By 2008/09 stocks had 
recovered to 8 million MT for wheat and 15 million MT for rice.  This obviously added  
 
Figure 5: End Year Stock for Wheat
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Figure 6: End of Year Stock of Rice 
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Source: USDA Database 
 
to the demand pressure for both wheat and rice. Thus, India imported 6.7 million MT of 
wheat in 2006/07 and 2 million MT in 2007/08 as compared with almost zero imports in 
the past 6 years.  Regarding rice, exports declined from a peak of 5.5 million MT in 
2006/07 to only 2.0 million MT in 2008/09.   These developments in domestic supply-
demand balances suggest that similar to global experience, domestic food shortages are 
an important factor underlying food price pressures in South Asian countries.  
 
At the country level, foodgrain prices moved differently from the global prices and within 
the region. In terms of staple food wheat consumption is concentrated in Afghanistan, 
India and Pakistan who account for about 90 percent of total wheat consumed in South 
Asia.  Rice, on the other hand, is more widely consumed in all countries.  So, in looking 
at price trends and impact, we will take these considerations into account.   
 
The trend in wheat prices in South Asia’s major wheat consuming countries is shown in 
Figure 7.  Unfortunately, comparable data for Afghanistan is not available.  So we will 
rely on fragmented data.  Figure 7 shows that wheat prices in both India and Pakistan 
increased in response to the global pressure,  but the increases were much less intense,         
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Figure 7. Wheat Prices in South Asia (2002=100)
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Source: Compiled from various data sources of concerned authorities 
 
especially in India (figure 8).  Indeed, India managed to maintain a fairly stable wheat 
price that increased by only 33 percent between 2002 and 2008 March and by only 12 
percent between 2006 and March 2008.    Pakistan experienced sharper increases, but 
they happened  in two phases.  The first phase was between 2003 and 2005 and the 
second phase between March 2008 and August 2008.  In total, the wheat price increased 
by 98 percent between 2002 and August 2008; it increased by 37 percent between 2006 
and August 2008. Afghanistan on the other hand suffered much more.  Although longer 
term trend data are not available, short term data shows that the wheat prices increased by 
157 to 259 percent between May 2007 and 2008. (Table 6).  These increases are even  
sharper than by global standards.  The marked regional variation in price increases in 
Afghanistan  suggests the low mobility of food grain within the country due to poor trade 
logistics and security problems. 
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Figure 8 Compartive Wheat Price Increases
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Table. 6. Wheat Prices in Afghanistan 
Prices (Afs/kg) Region 
May 07 May 08  
Percent Change from May 2007
Kabul 13.3 39.0 193% 
Kandahar 12.0 35.8 198% 
Jalalabad 11.2 35.8 221% 
Heart 11.7 34.0 190% 
Mazar 9.9 35.5 259% 
Faizabad 17.3 44.4 157% 
Source: World Bank (2008) 
 
The movement in rice prices is shown in Figure 9.  As in the case of wheat, South Asian 
rice prices on average rose less than in the global market and there are marked 
differences by countries.  For the period as a whole, Pakistan witnessed the most rapid 
increase followed by Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and India (Figure 10).  Again, as in 
the case of wheat, India experienced the lowest price increase in the region, which is 
strikingly lower than the global price rise and the rest of the region. 
 
There are two interesting questions:  Why did South Asia experience substantially lower 
price increases of wheat and rice than the global market? And secondly, how did India 
manage to virtually insulate its economy from higher global rice and wheat prices?  The 
answer to the first question lies in that all South Asian countries, except Afghanistan, 
largely rely on domestic grain production. The dependence on trade is low and most  
 12
Figure 9: Rice Price Trend in South Asia (2002=100)
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Figure 10 Comparative Rice Price Increases
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countries use trade restrictions and fiscal policy interventions that put a wedge between 
international and domestic prices, especially during an upswing. In the case of 
Afghanistan, domestic production on average substantially falls behind consumption 
needs, leading to a relatively large reliance on trade, especially from Pakistan.  So the 
combined effects of higher global wheat prices and Pakistan’s export ban caused wheat 
prices in Afghanistan to surge much higher than elsewhere.  Regarding the second 
question, there are a number of factors that helped India insulate its economy from global 
price increases. First, India experienced a very good wheat and rice harvest in 2007-2008.  
Second, it was much more agile in anticipating the need to build up stocks and responded 
very quickly with release of food through public distribution. Third, India tightened 
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export restrictions with a view to protecting domestic consumers. India’s policy response 
on the trade front has led to a major political economy debate in South Asia about the 
role of trade in agriculture.  We will turn to this debate later.    
 
IV. How Has the Food and Fuel Crisis Affected South Asia?  
 
 (i) Macroeconomic Impacts 
 
Severe terms of trade loss. While South Asia relies relatively less on grain imports, its 
reliance on petroleum and other commodities is quite large.  As a result, given the sharp 
increase in commodity prices, the region has experienced severe terms of trade loss, 
deterioration in the external and internal balance, and adverse economic and social 
impact on the poor. Figure 11 shows the effects of the terms of trade shock in South Asia 
relative to other regions, while Figure 12 shows the impact by countries within South 
Asia. Figure 11 tells a striking story.  On a net basis South has suffered the most loss of 
income as a percent of GDP among all developing regions.  
 
Within South Asia, the picture at a country level is quite divergent (Figure 12).  Losses 
range from 34 percent for the tiny Island country of Maldives to 8 percent for 
Bangladesh.  Much of the loss has come from petroleum, where all countries have lost. In 
the food sector, Maldives, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka lost out quite a bit from the 
global price hike.  Although reliable data is not available for Afghanistan, the loss from 
oil and food price crisis is likely to be substantial for Afghanistan, which is especially 
vulnerable on food account and faced steepest price increases in the region.    
 
 
Figure 11: Comparative Regional Income Loss from Terms of Trade Shock 
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Figure 12: Income Loss from Terms of Trade Shock in South Asian Countries 
 
 
 
Deterioration in fiscal and external balances.  The large loss of income from terms of 
trade shock was partially compensated by rising remittances (figures 13a-b). Nevertheless 
there has been a negative impact on the external balances of most South Asian countries 
(Figure 14).  Pakistan suffered the most rapid deterioration in the current account 
balance, which turned from a surplus of around 4 percent of GDP in 2003 to a deficit  
 
 
Figure 13a: Trend in Remittance and Other Capital Inflows in South Asia 
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Figure 13b. Remittance Inflows in South Asian Countries in 2007 
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of over 8 percent of GDP in 2008.  Sri Lanka similarly experienced a substantial increase 
in the current account deficit.  Even in India, the current account widened sharply from a 
surplus of more than 2 percent of GDP in 2004 to a deficit of over 3 percent in 2008.  The 
current balance in Nepal that was in surplus for a fairly long period finally turned into a 
deficit in 2008. Bangladesh also lost on the trade account, but continued to enjoy a 
surplus in its current balance owing to remittances.  These differential effects reflect a 
number of factors including:  the relative magnitude of terms of trade shocks, the 
differences in compensating growth of remittances, and policy responses. Bangladesh in 
particular benefitted tremendously from the growth in remittances. India and Bangladesh 
took measures to tighten demand.  Pakistan and Sri Lanka were already facing balance of 
payments pressures from expansionary fiscal and monetary policies; the terms of trade 
shocks accelerated the deterioration. 
 
 
Figure 14: South Asia Current Account Deficits  
 
India Bangladesh Pakistan Sri Lanka Nepal Maldives 
US$ billion % of GDP
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Concerning fiscal balance, all countries except Sri Lanka registered large deterioration 
(figure 15).  The fiscal deficit widened most for Pakistan, rising from 2.4 percent of GDP 
in 2004 to 7.4 percent in 2008.  India had made good progress in reducing fiscal deficit 
between 2003 and 2007.  This progress was reversed in 2008 due to a sharp increase in 
the fuel subsidy (growing from 1 % of GDP in FY2007 to an estimated 4% of GDP in  
 
Figure 15. Fiscal Deficits in South Asia
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FY2009) that threatens to wipe off the gains made so painfully over the past few years.  
Bangladesh took steps to contain the fiscal deficit.  Even so, budget deficit widened to 
almost 5 percent in 2008 and is projected to grow further, mostly due to increases in food 
and petroleum subsidies and spending on safety nets4.  Nepal’s fiscal deficit has also 
grown from its low level in 2004 owing mainly due to fuel subsidy.  Sri Lanka is the only 
surprising exception. It has long suffered from high fiscal deficits linked to the ongoing 
civil war.  As a result, it had little space to expand further the deficit. Instead, Sri Lanka 
passed on most of the global price increases in petroleum to consumers.  
 
Impact on inflation: Rising food and fuel prices have been a major source of 
inflationary pressure in South Asian countries (Figure 16).  In Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal, food prices made a bigger impact on inflation than fuel 
prices.  In India, however, the main surge to inflation came from fuel price increases.  
Pakistan experienced the most rapid change in the rate of inflation, rising from 8 percent 
in 2006 to 25 percent in July 2008.  This is in part due to the global food price hike, but 
also due to domestic demand pressure emerging from unsustainable macroeconomic 
policies.  Sri Lanka had already been experiencing inflationary pressure from 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies; the surge in food and fuel prices accelerated 
the pace.  Afghanistan’s inflation hike came primarily from food prices.  Since the 
increase in grain prices for Afghanistan much exceeded other South Asian countries 
                                                     
4 Includes off-budget subsidies.  Recent reduction in world fuel prices if sustained will help keep fiscal 
deficit at the 5% of GDP level.  
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Figure 16: Trend in Inflation in South Asia 
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the inflation acceleration was quite intense (Figure 17).    With the recent decline in 
global grain and petroleum prices, inflation rates are coming down in South Asia even 
though the effects of the decline are partly offset by rapid currency depreciation in India 
and Pakistan. 
 
 
Figure 17: Food and Non-Food Inflation in Afghanistan, January 07-June 08 
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Poverty and Distributional Impacts  
 
The impact of rising food prices on poverty in an individual country depends on several 
factors including: (i) the extent world market prices are passed through to domestic 
prices; (ii) the initial poverty level and number of people clustered around the poverty 
line; (iii) the number of net buyers or net sellers of the commodities in question; (iv) the 
share of poor people’s budgets devoted to food overall and key staples in particular; (v) 
the extent of own-consumption relative to market purchases; and (vi) the effect of food 
price increases on real wages of poor people. (World Bank 2008a).  
 
A recent study in eight countries estimates that the rise in food prices between 2005 and 
2007 increased poverty by 3 percentage points on average. Extrapolating these results 
globally suggests that, as a result of the rise in food prices, total world poverty may have 
increased by 73-105 million people. (World Bank 2008a) 
 
For South Asia, a definitive analysis of how the food price increase affected poverty is 
currently underway using country level data5.  Preliminary findings from the study 
indicate that the net effect will be to increase poverty significantly. This can be 
appreciated from the following points.  First, South Asian poor on average spend between 
25-60 percent of their total income on staple food; this share rises as we go down the 
expenditure/income scale.  Second, there are many more poor household who are net 
buyers of staple food than net sellers. Third, availability and access to official safety net 
programs is hugely limited by inadequate fiscal space and weak institutions. 
 
Among all South Asian countries, Afghanistan arguably is most vulnerable to increases 
in staple food prices.  Unfortunately, as noted, Afghanistan also suffered the most 
increase in prices in the region. Afghanistan’s sensitivity to food prices can be gauged 
from the fact that Afghanistan’s poverty estimates range from a low of 33 percent in the 
normal food season to 42 percent in the lean season.  Some 35 percent of Afghan 
households do not meet their minimum daily calorie intake and 46 percent are classified 
as having very poor dietary diversity and poor food consumption.  
   
For Pakistan, a simulation based on the 2005/006 PSLM suggests that the 73 percent food 
price inflation between January 2007 and July 2008 would lead to a 3.2 percentage point 
increase in the national poverty headcount rate.  
 
In the case of Bangladesh, a simulation study assessed the impact of a nearly 40 percent 
increase in retail rice price between May 2007 and April 2008. In the short run, a 
majority of households are adversely affected by the rice price increases because only 17 
percent of Bangladeshi household are net suppliers of rice.  In the absence of any wage 
adjustment, the increase in rice price reduces real household’s expenditures by an average 
of 5 percent.  The impact is larger for urban (5.5 percent) than for rural households (4.6 
percent).  The impact is much worse for the bottom quintile, where average income 
declines by 10.5 percent as compared with less than 2.5 percent for the top two quintiles.  
Among the occupation group, only households headed by farmers (24 percent of all 
                                                     
5 A regional policy note on food price impact on the poor is in progress. 
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households) benefit from rice price increase. But even among farmers those with 
landholdings less than 1.5 acres tend to be hurt. The adverse effect is highest for 
households headed by agricultural or non-agricultural day workers, and lowest among 
households headed by salaried workers.  With a 5 percent increase in nominal wages, 
average income declines by 3 percent for the population and 7.7 percent for the bottom 
quintile. Regarding poverty impact, using the 2005 HIES survey, the rice price hike is 
estimated to increase the poverty headcount rate by 5 percentage points in the absence of 
any wage increase and by 3 percentage points assuming a 5 percent nominal wage 
increase, compared to what the poverty rate would have been in the absence of the price 
shock.6 The simulation also suggests an increase in income inequality since the poorest 
of the poor absorb a greater share of the burden of price increase in view of their larger 
share of expenditure on staple food in the consumption basket    
 
In Sri Lanka, according to the World Bank’s Poverty Assessment, a large share of the 
population is clustered around the poverty line, implying that relatively small changes in 
per capita consumption can lead to relatively large changes in poverty rates.  Simulations 
based on the 2006-07 HIES indicate that the 83 percent increase in rice prices between 
June 2007 and May 2008 would lead to a 5 percentage points increase in the poverty head 
count.  Moreover, adverse effects on calories consumption per day, which is already low, 
would be expected.  
 
As we saw earlier, of the South Asian countries India experienced lower food price 
increases than others. Nevertheless, the prices of wheat and rice increased faster than 
normally between 2006-2008.  Given that only about a fourth of all households are net 
sellers of these cereals, a majority of households would be adversely affected by these 
price increases.  Among farmers also not all benefit: a majority of marginal and small 
farmers appear to be hurt by price increases, with benefits of increases remaining largely 
limited to large farmers.  Among non-farm households, rural poor households lose the 
most (a 10% decline in total consumption), followed by rural non-poor and urban poor 
households. 
 
V. South Asia’s Response to the Food Crisis: Short-term Responses 
 
Given the adverse implications of the food price increases for the poor and the political 
transition, it is understandable why South Asian policy makers were willing to take any 
policy step that would help stabilize domestic prices without worrying too much about 
the potential long-term effects. Hence, much of the immediate actions were focused on 
stabilizing prices and not on supply response or other dimensions of policy management, 
including the fiscal impact. The types of policy actions taken in each of the countries are 
conveniently summarized in Table 7.  These fall in four broad categories: trade policy 
6 These estimates do not imply that poverty headcount rate in 2008 would be 5 or 3 percentage points 
higher than that in 2005. Such an interpretation would be incorrect since that would ignore the poverty 
reduction that would have occurred between 2005 and 2008 due to strong and stable economic growth.  
Rather, the poverty impact estimated here is a comparison with what would have been the case had there 
been no rice price shock in 2008 
 
Table 7: Country Policy Responses 
 
Economy-wide Policies  Social Protection Programs  Country 
Reduce taxes 
on foodgrains2 
Stock 
management 
Export restrictions Pricing policies Cash 
transfer 
Food for 
work 
Food ration/stamp School feeding 
Afghanistan*  √          √     
Bangladesh*  √  √  √ 
Imposed ban on rice 
exports 
 √  √ 
 
 √ 
Long history 
and being 
expanded 
 √ 
Food Rations eliminated but millions 
of poor households get Vulnerable 
Group Feeding (VGF) cards which 
entitle them to 15 kg. grains per 
month. 
 √ 
Was replaced by 
cash grants but is 
being restarted. 
Bhutan  √  √    √  √      √ 
India  √  √  √ 
Imposed ban on wheat 
and non-Basmati rice 
exports, and high taxes 
on Basmati rice exports 
 √    √  √ 
Maintains a pretty active public food 
distribution system 
 √ 
Maldives  √  √    √  √ 
For specially 
vulnerable 
groups 
     √ 
Nepal*     √ 
Imposed ban on rice 
exports 
     √    √ 
Limited coverage 
Pakistan*   √  √ 
Imposed ban on wheat 
exports 
 √  √   food ration/stamp programs have not 
been implemented (the caretaker 
government announced that food 
ration cards would be introduced, but it 
never happened) 
 √ 
Sri Lanka*  √   NO explicit ban on rice 
exports although trade 
protection and other 
measures have kept 
domestic prices above 
international prices. 
 √  √    √ School feeding 
program has very 
limited reach. 
Source: Country authorities
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measures; stock management and public distribution; pricing policy measures; and safety 
net measures.  
 
(a) Trade Policies:   Almost all countries reduced import duties on food items. For 
example, India lowered import duties/tariffs on edible oils, wheat flour, semi/wholly 
milled rice, maize, butter and asked states to impose limits on stocks of commodities 
under the Essential Commodities Act.  Bangladesh similarly lowered import duty on a 
range of food items and initiated a crack-down on domestic hoarding, which back-fired 
and was abandoned. Afghanistan lowered tariff on wheat and wheat flour from 2.5 
percent to zero. Nepal also lowered import duties on food.  Sri Lanka uses a 35% tariff on 
rice imports to keep domestic rice prices high for producers.  When domestic rice prices 
started rising the government initially waived the tariff, but re-imposed it for fiscal 
reasons.  However, Sri Lanka lowered duties on a range of other food items like lentils 
and edible oil. 
 
In a further effort to control domestic food prices, most South Asian countries also 
clamped down on food exports by imposing export taxes or other levies or, worse, 
choked off food exports altogether through export bans, thus making the situation in 
neighboring food-deficit countries particularly dire. India, for example, put a stop on all 
non-Basmati rice exports and wheat and imposed prohibitive tariff on Basmati exports. 
Pakistan banned wheat exports as well as restrictions on domestic inter-provincial 
wheat.7 Bangladesh and Nepal followed suit and imposed export bans on rice.  
                                                     
 
Buffer Stock and Public Distribution 
 
In South Asia India has the most extensive public food grain distribution system covering 
some 600 million consumers, believed to be the largest in the world. India’s food 
stocking policy has a multiplicity of objectives: manage crisis situations; provide 
incentive to farmers; provide low-price supply to consumers.  Pakistan maintains food 
stock basically for price support but also to keep prices low for consumers.  But unlike 
India, Pakistan sells of most of the procured wheat to millers at subsidized prices.  The 
price effect for consumers is indirect. Bangladesh had gradually moved away from food 
stocks for public distribution to market transactions based on private sector.  Publicly 
held stocks were kept at low level mainly to meet emergency situation.  Normal supply 
shortages are met through imports.  Sri Lanka, Nepal and Afghanistan basically rely on 
the market for supply decisions. Nepal benefits from open-access to India’s food market 
and as such has not seen the need for public distribution. Sri Lanka, however, uses price 
controls and import duties to regulate domestic foodgrain production, supply and prices.     
 
We saw earlier (Section III) that armed with rising fiscal costs and waste from massive 
stock-piling, India had rapidly drawn down its reserves between 2000 and 2007. But 
anticipating food shortages, India quickly moved to build up the stocks of wheat through 
imports and rice through public procurement.  These food market interventions on the 
supply side then enabled India to use the public distribution system to stabilize domestic
7 There is clear evidence that export bans imposed by India and Pakistan has aggravated the foods crisis in 
South Asia, and this issue is much debated.  
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grain prices very successfully. 8 Other large South Asian countries also moved, although 
less successfully than India, to build up stocks and stabilize domestic prices.  Bangladesh 
traditionally had maintained a low food stock and relied much more on private imports to 
meet domestic shortfalls. The global food price crisis, accentuated by crop losses from 
floods and cyclone, and trade ban by India reduced the effectiveness of this strategy and 
exposed Bangladesh to far more rapid increases in domestic rice and wheat price 
increases than in India. However, the government intervened by importing food, even 
though at rising cost, and distributing some 0.5 million tons of coarse rice the market 
through Open Market Sales (OMS) through official channels as well as authorized 
dealers at subsidized prices.  It also sought  to build up its stock from a low of 0.4 million 
metric tons of rice in June 2007 to 0.9 million tons in June 2008 through imports as well 
as domestic procurement once the crops recovered from the external shocks.  
 
In Pakistan, a wheat exporting country, as international prices started rising, there was an 
initial surge in wheat exports. To stem the domestic price increases the government 
banned exports and accelerated release of wheat from its stocks.  So, from September 
2007 to March 2008, the Government released around 4.3 million tons of wheat from its 
strategic reserve and distributed to flour mills at subsidized rates. However, while the 
government succeeded in lowering the rate of increase of domestic wheat prices, the 
wedge between domestic and international prices, caused a huge amount of wheat 
smuggling as well as private stock piling.  So, in response to domestic shortages, the 
government also imported about 1.7 million tones of wheat.  In addition, the government 
raised the procurement price of wheat from US$163/ton and to US$240/ton to narrow the 
difference between domestic and international prices to create an incentive for farmers to 
sell to the domestic market and to discourage smuggling and hoarding.  
 
In Sri Lanka, the Government capped the retail price of Samba rice at Rs 70 per kilo, 
about 30 percent lower than the prevailing market price. With respect to buffer stocks, 
there is a long legacy of state intervention in the domestic paddy market. During the 2007 
Maha season, the Government purchased about 90 million of paddy, equivalent to 4.5 
percent of the total harvest.  However, Government intervention is primarily aimed at 
securing a minimum price for farmers, and since farm gate prices have been rising 
rapidly since 2007, the Government has not made any purchases during the 2007 Yala 
harvest, or the 2008 Maha harvest.  Recent reports suggest that the Government is 
considering to gradually establishing strategic rice reserves to be able to better control 
price swings. 
 
Nepal traditionally maintains very low strategic reserves (less than 10K MT) and very 
limited public distribution. But it also intervened to augment supply through public 
distribution, especially after the imposition of trade ban by India.  The only country 
where an active stocking arrangement and public distribution does not exist is 
Afghanistan.  However, the World Food Program (WFP) has played an important role in 
augmenting domestic availability through imports. 
 
                                                     
8  However, as Dorosh (2008) has pointed out this was not without cost in terms of lower earnings from rice 
exports.  
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Pricing of Inputs and Outputs 
 
Maintaining low food prices has been a key policy objective in most South Asian 
countries.  Since low prices tend to discourage production, a complex system of 
subsidies, production controls, public procurement and distribution have emerged in 
South Asia with the twin objectives of maintaining low grain prices for consumers while 
also providing incentives to farmers through input subsidies and price support based on 
public procurement.  On the input side, almost all farm inputs: water, power and fertilizer 
are subsidized in varying degrees in most countries.  Thus, in India, most states heavily 
subsidize power consumption by farmers ranging up to 100 percent subsidy (zero power 
tariff) with a view to subsidizing irrigation. Power tariffs for farmers have not been 
adjusted despite the substantial increase in fuel costs. All countries subsidize diesel to 
lower transport cost as well as to reduce irrigation costs.  In response to an effort to 
contain the unsustainably large increase in budget subsidy, countries have taken steps 
recently to partially adjust diesel prices.  The largest adjustment happened in Sri Lanka, 
which has basically passed on the international oil prices to consumers.  Bangladesh, 
India and Nepal have also adjusted domestic fuel prices, but diesel remains heavily 
subsidized.  Pakistan did the least adjustment in passing on the increase in fuel price 
increases.  Regarding fertilizer, whose price surged more than four-fold between 2002 
and August 2008, much of the cost increase is absorbed by the government budget 
including in Sri Lanka.  Indeed, along with the diesel subsidy the growing cost of 
fertilizer subsidy is a key factor underlying the expansion of fiscal deficits in South Asian 
countries.   
 
On the output side, policy intervention has sought to reduce prices for consumers in 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan through augmentation of domestic supply based 
on open market sale and public distribution, and through price cap in Sri Lanka.  
Afghanistan does not have an active government intervention program.  To offset the 
adverse effects on farmer incentives, governments in India and Pakistan have tended to 
provide support prices to farmers through public procurement.  Thus, India raised 
minimum support price (MSP) for wheat from Rs. 850 per 100 kilogram in 2007 Rs 1000 
in 2008. Similarly, the procurement price of rice was raised from Rs 650 per 100 kg. to 
Rs 775 per kg.  In Pakistan, the government raised the procurement price of wheat from 
US$163/ton to US$240/ton to narrow the difference between domestic and international 
prices and to create an incentive for farmers to sell to the domestic market rather than 
resort to smuggling and hoarding.  Bangladesh set a procurement price for rice that is 
about 15 percent lower than the prevailing market price.  In effect, this has provided a 
floor on the domestic rice price. Sri Lanka did not see the need to intervene to provide 
additional incentives to farmers as the producer price of rice was some 70 percent higher 
than the price last year despite the ceiling imposed by the government.  
 
Safety Nets 
 
All South Asian countries intervened to provide some kind of safety net protection to its 
most vulnerable citizens.  Among all South Asian countries, Sri Lanka has the most 
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extensive set of social safety net programs, particularly in the form of cash transfer 
programs targeted towards the poor and vulnerable groups. On the other hand, 
Afghanistan has very little organized national safety net system and is naturally most 
vulnerable to exogenous shocks. These safety net interventions include generalized 
public food distribution, targeted food distribution including food for works, school 
meals, conditional and non-conditional cash transfers, and employment guarantee 
schemes.   
 
Generalized public food distribution system:  As noted, India has the most extensive 
coverage of the public food distribution system (PDS) in South Asia.  India’s PDS has 
come under serious criticism for corruption, inefficiency and high fiscal cost. Various 
reforms have sought to address these concerns but problems remain.  The contribution of 
the PDS to stabilizing food prices quickly in the face of global food price turmoil is seen 
in India as an important success for public policy and has presented a challenge to 
conventional thinking on the merits of public role in food distribution in countries with a 
large number of poor, high political sensitivity to food price increases, and administrative 
capacity constraints to implementing well-targeted safety net programs.  Public food 
distribution in Pakistan has helped stabilize prices somewhat, although it is indirect and 
has been much less effective than in India. 
 
Targeted food distribution:  A range of targeted food distribution programs exist in South 
Asia. In India (Andhra Pradesh), rice is being made available at the hugely subsidized 
price of Rs. 2 per kilogram to 18.7 million families below poverty line (BPL) having 
ration cards. Each family will be entitled to 20 kg of subsidized rice every month 
supplied through government-run fair price shops. The government of Bangladesh has 
authorized Open Market Sales (OMS) of coarse rice in urban townships at subsidized 
rates. The approach here is to use self-targeting, given the low quality of rice and the long 
lines. Additionally, Bangladesh has intensified the use of the Vulnerable Group Feeding 
Program to reach out the poorest of the poor. All South Asian countries, except 
Afghanistan, have used the school feeding programs to reach the children group, who are 
among the most vulnerable to food price shocks.  Several countries (Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Nepal and India) have expanded their food for work programs to provide a 
safety net for the unemployed. In the case of Nepal and Afghanistan this expansion has 
been of the WFP food for work program, while Bangladesh in particular has a long 
history of using this program.   
 
Conditional and Unconditional cash transfers:  Public cash transfer programs exist in 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Maldives. Conditional cash transfers 
(e.g. stipends) exist in many countries too (Nepal, Pakistan, and Bangladesh).  
Conditional Cash Transfers for the poor are being piloted in Nepal, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan. The use of cash transfer programs is limited by the lack of proper institutional 
arrangements.  The programs are still evolving but hold the prospects of providing 
effective safety net cover if these are well designed and administered. 
 
Rural Employment Guarantee Schemes:   One of the earliest rural employment guarantee 
schemes in South Asia was initiated by Maharashtra in the early 1990s.  In 2007 India 
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initiated a similar program called National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(NREGS) as a means to address the poverty problems of the ultra-poor that do not have 
any alternative job opportunities. Bangladesh has also introduced a rural employment 
guarantee program, estimated to cost about taka 24 billion (2 percent of GDP) for 
providing employment to the rural poor in economically depressed areas during the lean 
agricultural seasons.  
 
While the global food price has helped South Asian countries to refocus on the safety net 
issues, which is overall a weak area of policy, there are major issues relating to 
efficiency, corruption, and fiscal cost that need careful research and analysis. For 
example, safety net reviews that evaluate public safety net program have now been 
conducted in Pakistan, India, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. These show 
that some schemes work well, but that their efficiency could be improved via investment 
in their capacity to target, deliver benefit, improve accountability, and improve 
monitoring and evaluation. Many of the schemes are new (cash transfer programs, 
employment guarantee schemes) which require careful review in terms of design and 
implementation before wider replication.  Moreover, the lack of a central strategic body 
which coordinates the myriad of safety net programs currently in place is a serious 
weakness given large unmet needs and finite resources. Limited fiscal space in particular 
requires focus on the few schemes that have worked well in South Asia and other 
developing countries.    
 
VI. Longer-Term Policy Issues and Challenges: Moving Forward 
 
 The large magnitude of the terms of trade shock along with the acceleration of food 
prices, especially staple food grains of wheat and rice, have clearly imposed a 
tremendous burden on South Asian countries, especially on the low income economies of 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. Governments have responded in varying degrees to 
contain the rise in prices as well as to mitigate the adverse effects on the poor.  Yet, the 
negative impact remains substantial and further efforts are needed to respond more 
effectively to the external shocks.  While the recent decline in food and fuel prices are a 
welcome development for South Asia, this gain is being clouded by the onslaught of the 
global financial crisis that is threatening to substantially lower exports, investment and 
economic growth. Continued high food prices and supply shortages will aggravate the 
situation.  Policies taken by governments in the first round were aimed at stabilizing food 
prices. Some of the policies like trade bans, price controls and subsidies may have been 
justifiable as short-term response on political economy grounds, but they have adverse 
implications for efficiency and resource allocation over the longer term.  As well, the 
fiscal space is scarce and the magnitudes of the subsidies entailed are not likely to be 
sustainable.  Similarly, the efforts of governments to initiate safety net programs are 
laudable; yet there is a need to examine the programs carefully to ensure their 
effectiveness and fiscal sustainability.  Finally, the longer term agenda of addressing the 
supply problems in agriculture remain to be fully tackled.  At the heart of South Asia’s 
supply response is the challenge of farm productivity.  Issues related to farm productivity, 
trade policies, stock management, input-output pricing and safety nets are reviewed 
briefly below.   
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a) Agriculture Productivity: Despite rapid growth since 1980, South Asia’s dependence 
on agriculture remains substantial. While agriculture’s contribution to value added has 
declined rapidly, it still remains higher than most regions ( figure 18).  More  
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Source: World Bank 2007. 
 
importantly, between 35-50 percent of the labor force remains reliant on agriculture for 
livelihood, suggesting very low average productivity (figure 19)9.  Since world 
commodity prices of energy and fertilizer are likely to remain substantially higher than 
the levels in 2004, the only sustainable way of reconciling higher input costs with low 
 
Figure 19. Agricultural Productivity (2000$/worker)
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9 Employment shares range from a low of 35 percent in Sri Lanka to a high of 50 percent for Bangladesh 
(World Bank 2007). 
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and stable prices of wheat and rice for citizen’s is to pay attention to farm productivity.  
This is among the most urgent policy focus for South Asian governments. 
 
The scope for productivity improvements is clear from figure 19, but this can be seen 
more specifically from the productivity comparisons of the two major food crops, wheat 
and rice.  The trends in productivity improvements in South Asia and global comparators 
for wheat and rice  per hectare of land cultivated are shown in figures 20 and 21.   
 
Figure 20. Wheat Productivity Trends
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Figure 21. Rice Productivity Trend
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Focusing on land productivity is particularly important in South Asia where land 
endowment is likely to emerge as a binding constraint. Regarding wheat, the two major 
South Asian wheat producing countries (India and Pakistan) achieved substantial gains in 
productivity between 1970 and 2000, but faced stagnation since then.  Productivity 
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improvements and yield per hectare compare positively with North America but yield 
remains way behind EEC countries and East Asia.  For example, India faces a wheat 
productivity gap of 40 percent with East Asia and 50 percent with EEC.   Concerning 
rice, South Asian countries show significant gains since 1970, especially in Bangladesh 
and Sri Lanka.  Yet the productivity gap with most of the world (except Sub-Saharan 
Africa) is large. For example the average per hectare yield in the better performing South 
Asian countries of Sri Lanka and Bangladesh is still 40 percent lower than the yield in  
North Africa, 25 percent lower than North America, and  10 percent lower than in East 
Asia.  The rice productivity gaps are larger for India and Pakistan, and the largest for 
Nepal. 
 
The yield gaps in South Asia for both wheat and rice are huge and suggest the need for 
urgent policy attention to find ways to catch up with the performance in the high-yielding 
countries.  This entails addressing issues relating to technology, inputs (especially water, 
fertilizer and energy), pest control and farmer incentives.  The range of policies that 
impact on productivity include incentive policies for farmers (pricing policies, ownership 
and tenancy issues), timely availability of key inputs, farm credit, crop insurance and 
public expenditure.  The rising cost of energy, the emerging water shortages, and the 
frequency of natural disasters especially from flooding and drought, suggest also the need 
to pay attention to global public goods such as climate change, cross-boundary water 
sharing arrangements and regional energy trade.   More and better regional cooperation 
can be an effective way to manage the farm productivity challenge and ought to be a key 
element in the design of future food policy strategies in South Asia (Ahmed 2008).    
 
(b) Trade policies: The economic case for reforming agricultural trade policies to 
enhance global welfare is quite strong. This requires coordinated efforts in both 
developed and developing countries.  A concise summary of the trade reforms at the 
global level is contained in Chauffour (2008). In practice, agriculture trade policies tend 
to get enmeshed in political economy issues and using purely economic rationale for 
advocating trade policies for agriculture is fraught with risk of being ignored by policy 
makers.  This is partly because of the huge reliance of the labor force on agriculture for 
income, but also because of the objectives to maintain food prices low for consumers and 
avoid the kinds of disruption illustrated by the global food price crisis. So, we are 
essentially in the second best world.  All South Asian countries  are engaged in 
substantial domestic production of food items, especially food grain.  Food self-
sufficiency is also a driving force in policy making in the area of agriculture strategy and 
trade policy.  Reliance on trade is subsidiary. On balance India and Pakistan are net 
exporters of food while Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka are net importers 
(Table 8).   
 
While the first best arguments against trade protection in terms of comparative advantage 
and efficiency of resource allocation are often well known at the policy level, from the 
political economy perspective the real policy choice is how to balance these concerns 
with the political economy issues of protecting the incomes of farmers and avoiding 
supply disruptions for consumers.  The sharply adverse consequences of extreme trade 
policies, such as a ban on exports employed during the crisis by many countries including 
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Table 8: South Asia Trade Balance for Raw Food 
Net Imports (US$ million) Net Imports as % of all imports) Country 
1980/81 1990/91 2000/01 2004/05 1980/81 1990/91 2000/01 2004/05 
Sri Lanka  -73 -110 -167 -248 -5 -5 -3 -3 
Bangladesh -224 -196 -317 -674 -13 -7 -4 -6 
India 31 313 1,214 1,865 0 2 3 2 
Nepal 13 6 1 -53 7 1 0 -4 
Pakistan 155 0 512 465 4 0 7 3 
Afghanistan 23 12 -53 -82 9 3 -8 -3 
Source: UN COMTRADE Statistics 
Note: Food is defined as raw food, excluding all cash crops, processed food products and seafood 
 
in South Asia, are illustrative of the importance of drawing the right balance in the policy 
choice.  The evidence is clear that these restrictions accentuated the price volatility, 
especially in the thinly traded rice market, and created added uncertainty facing food 
importing countries. Trade restrictions also increase the cost of food security as countries 
tend to build larger food stock reserves than necessary to counter uncertainty in trade.   
 
On average trade policies for agriculture are more restrictive in South Asia than in other 
regions (see Table 9) suggesting the scope for lower protection.  The efficiency loss from 
these high  trade restrictions  needs to be carefully evaluated against the gains.  
Importantly, trade barriers among neighbors are not very effective over the medium to 
long term, given physical proximity and informal trade opportunities.   Trade cooperation 
with neighbors would appear to be a more potent way of managing food security than 
trade bans because such bans simply fuel high-cost informal trade and rent seeking at the 
expense of both the farmers and the consumers.  
 
Table 9: Trade Restrictiveness in Agriculture in 2006 
 
 
Overall Trade 
Restrictiveness Index 
Tariff Trade 
Restrictiveness Index 
East Asia  26.6 8.7 
Europe and Central Asia 25.9 10.3 
Latin America & Caribbean 28.1 6.6 
Middle East and North Africa 32.3 12.1 
South Asia  46.4 31.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 24.9 13.8 
Source: Kee, Hiau Looi, Alessandro Nicita, and Marcelo Olarreaga,  “Estimating Trade 
Restrictiveness Indices.” 
 
c) Food Stock and Public Distribution System:   This is another area of controversy.  
Most countries maintain some kind of a stock to respond to supply shortages in a crisis 
situation.  Some countries also maintain stocks to support a public distribution system.  
The goal here is to reconcile the twin objectives of giving farmer appropriate incentives 
through higher prices but moderating the effects on consumers by providing subsidized 
supplies to low income group through the public distribution system.  
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The subject of food stocks has been studied at length. A recent review of South Asian 
food stock system is available in Dorosh (2008b). The key questions that have emerged 
from the experience of South Asia and elsewhere include: multiplicity of objectives; 
efficiency of public distribution versus markets; corruption and wastage; role of trade; 
and fiscal costs.  India’s experience best illustrates these various issues and the challenges 
of trying to reconcile them. Historically, the growing cost of production has forced the 
government to accumulate a huge stock of rice and wheat at increasing prices.  In 
particular, wheat prices until 2006 were higher in India than internationally owing to the 
incentive policy, raising issues about efficiency of domestic supply.   At the same time, 
the government’s objective to keep prices low for consumers led to subsidies, 
contributing to a growing fiscal cost of public food distribution.  Concerns also emerged 
about losses from theft and corruption, and wastages from storages.  Despite these costs 
of the food stocking policy, India nevertheless feels vindicated by the ability to manage 
the global food price crisis much better than most countries of the world based on its food 
stocking and public distribution policies. Thus, the Indian policy maker is able to declare: 
“Thank goodness we did not listen to the Washington Consensus advice of letting 
markets work.  If we did, rice and wheat prices would have soared and impoverished 
millions of India’s poor people”.  
 
Even so, there is a need to rethink the right balance between food stocks and trade.  
Maintaining some level of stocks to meet emergency situation and global crises such as 
during 2007-08 is a sound policy decision.  Working out that prudent level while keeping 
an eye on fiscal cost, theft prevention and stock wastage is important. Participating in the 
global food market through trade with appropriate safeguards on domestic availability 
through foodstocks is a better policy option than to impose trade bans or prohibitive 
tariffs.   
 
d) Input-output pricing policies: The complex system of pricing interventions have 
distorted incentives, reduced the efficiency of farm production and added to the fiscal 
burden.  Importantly, this has tended to divert attention away from addressing the 
productivity challenge.  The key to resolving South Asia’s food challenge is to raise 
productivity. Importantly, the recent price increases for food crops provide policy makers 
a golden opportunity to revisit the whole support strategy for food policy. The improved 
terms of trade in favor of agriculture resulting from the global commodity price boom 
allows South Asian governments to let farmers benefit from these higher output prices 
while removing the fiscally expensive and inefficient subsidies. The resources thus saved 
could be redirected to areas that support farm productivity including spending on rural 
infrastructure (roads, irrigation, rural electricity), farm technology, research and 
extension.  Food security concerns on the supply side are possibly best addressed by 
focusing on farm productivity rather than through subsidized inputs.     
 
e)  Safety nets:  An effective safety net system is a key aspect of tackling food security 
on the demand side10. The immediate response of South Asian governments to use the 
existing safety net programs involving public food distribution is an understandable 
response to the food price crisis.  However, South Asian governments are also well 
                                                     
10 For a useful review of the role of safety nets in poverty reduction strategies, see Ravallion 2006. 
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advised to carefully think through doing so more effectively as well as using other 
programs for the medium to long term.  A review of international experience suggests the 
following broad guidelines to build upon in developing comprehensive safety net 
programs.  
   
• The route cause for poverty must not be overlooked in designing safety net 
schemes.  The most sustainable way of reducing poverty over the long-term is to 
ensure that policies protect economic growth and promote employment. 
• The design of an effective public expenditure program that supports economic 
growth and employment needs to be a key component of a comprehensive 
strategy for safety nets.  Thus, for example, a public expenditure program that 
links safety net programs with creating rural infrastructure and ties cash transfers 
with basic health and education (i.e. conditional cash transfer programs) is likely 
to yield better outcomes in terms of social protection than those which provide 
generalized subsidies.  
• Reduction of various vulnerabilities emerging from natural disasters and lack of 
access to credit would need to be a key component of an effective safety net 
strategy.  Micro credit schemes, for example, have played an important safety net 
role in a number of South Asian countries, especially Bangladesh.  Formal 
insurance schemes for ex-ante risk reduction can also be very helpful, but they are 
almost non-existent in South Asia. Most importantly, South Asia is yet to develop 
a comprehensive strategy to address the vulnerabilities emerging from climate 
change and lack of cross-boundary water cooperation.  
• Cash transfer programs are preferred to food or other in-kind transfers because 
cash increases the purchasing power of households and provides households with 
choices of how they meet their most pressing needs. Examples of conditional cash 
transfers that have worked well include the Food-for-Education Program in 
Bangladesh, Mexico’s PROGRESA program and the Bolsa Escola in Brazil. 
• The development impact of food based programs can be strengthened with the use 
of nutritionally fortified grains. A small share of food based safety net programs 
use fortified grains and a recent IFPRI evaluation in Bangladesh highlights their 
potential. Estimates show that providing vitamin A and zinc supplements are a 
highly cost-effective intervention when one takes into account the longer term 
development benefits of a well nourished child. 
• A common difficulty of implementing targeted programs during crises arises 
especially in countries which do not have a well designed and effective program 
in place.   In such cases, it may be more feasible to focus on existing self targeted 
programs that can be scaled up relatively quickly.  Well known examples of these 
programs in South Asia are the food for works program and the employment 
guarantee schemes.  The food for works program target unemployed workers to 
support the creation of infrastructure, such as rural roads or irrigation schemes.  
On average these programs have worked well, although the monitoring of 
administration and accountability needs to be strengthened.   
• Concerning, employment guarantee schemes, the best known example in South 
Asia is the Maharashtra’s EGS. In 2007, India initiated an even more ambitious 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS).  Bangladesh has 
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followed suit by announcing a similar program in 2008.  These programs can be 
an effective way of reducing vulnerability and supporting the poor provided these 
are designed well. The fiscal cost of these schemes also needs to be watched and 
managed.  The most important issue here is the wage level. The experience with 
the Maharashtra scheme suggests that wages were set too high, resulting in 
employment rationing (Datt and Ravallion 1993).  Self targeting will work only if 
the wage is set at a relatively low level so that the non-poor have no incentive to 
enter this program. The other important aspect is community involvement in the 
choice of projects to ensure that the work program creates assets that are useful to 
the community.     
 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
 
The surge in global commodity prices of the past few years has presented a tremendous 
development challenge for South Asian countries. The large loss of income from the 
terms of trade shock has worsened macroeconomic balances, fueled rapid inflation and 
hurt growth. While commodity prices have come down recently, the benefits are being 
clouded by the emergence of a severe global financial crisis.  The adverse consequences 
of the food price hike for the poor are large; the global financial crisis could further 
worsen the situation due to falling economic opportunities and government revenues. 
South Asian countries need to accelerate reforms to avoid facing a serious downturn in 
economic activity, investment, exports and income.   
 
Governments in South Asia have responded by stabilizing domestic food prices through a 
range of short-term measures, tightened monetary policy to reduce inflation, and 
increased spending on a range of safety net programs for the poor.  Some of the policies 
employed, such as export bans, are not consistent with the long-term welfare of the 
country or the region. Safety net interventions need to be made consistent with a longer-
term poverty reduction strategy and fiscal sustainability. Most importantly, policy 
attention now needs to shift toward efforts to increase farm productivity, improve rural 
infrastructure, and lower the vulnerability of the poor. In this regard, the increase in food 
crop prices provides a golden opportunity to policy makers to re-examine the complex 
system of input-output pricing interventions, reduce spending on input subsidies and 
instead refocus public spending on areas that will raise farm productivity (irrigation, rural 
roads, rural electricity) and move toward strengthening their safety net systems to address 
chronic poverty, but also respond to provide basic needs in times of economic shocks and 
natural disasters.  Public policy also needs to focus on reducing the vulnerabilities 
resulting from climate change and inadequate attention to cross-boundary water 
management.  More and better regional cooperation can be an effective way to manage 
the farm productivity challenge and lower the vulnerability of the poor and ought to be a 
key element in the design of future food policy strategies in South Asia. 
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